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Abstract 
Currently there appears to be a lack of research in the area of developing tools, testing methodologies, and 
creating standards for ADSL router forensics. The paper examines a wide range of literature and introduces the 
concept of ADSL router forensics as a new and potential field of research for digital forensics investigators. It 
begins by examining why there is a need for router forensics by detailing some of the more common threats 
which consumers may experience while online. An outline will be provided discussing the feasibility, limitations 
and potential risks of router forensics. The paper will then examine one possible avenue for undertaking router 
forensics and how this applies to the Linksys WRT54g and finally portrays where the research will continue to 
hereafter. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The demand for Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) devices has increased considerably as consumers 
are now offered fast and inexpensive methods to connect to the Internet. The plug and play nature of ADSL 
routers permits consumers to bypass the tedious configuration process and hence connect to the Internet within 
minutes. History has shown that the number of published exploits and threats for a particular device or software 
is generally proportional to the number of individual’s utilising that system. In this instance as broadband 
technology is becoming the predominant method for Internet connectivity the number of published exploits on 
the more common range of Small office Home office (SoHo) routers is also on a parallel rise. Hence, in order to 
combat and pursue criminals whom endeavour to maliciously destroy, alter and degrade a consumer’s online 
experience, techniques and standards must be developed to ensure a thorough forensic investigation of the 
networking device. As there are numerous threats to ADSL routers the number of standards, techniques and 
frameworks which could be used to forensically investigate a router is non-existent. The paper hereafter will 
introduce and discuss the necessity for sound ADSL router forensic principles. 
THREATS TO ADSL ROUTERS 
ADSL routers control the traffic flow between the Internet and the internal hosts on a SoHo network. As 
broadband technology becomes faster and more reliable consumers may opt to use their ADSL router to share an 
Internet connection in a home or office, utilise a personal or business internal web server, enjoy the benefits of 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and the convenience of file sharing. In some instances consumers are 
unaware of the potential security risks and recommended security approaches for ADSL routers (Szewczyk 
2006). However, the threats presented hereafter show that a simple and effortless method may disrupt or 
terminate an entire network connection to the rest of the world (Chang 2002). 
Denial of service attack 
A Denial of Service (DoS) attack targets routers in a ‘reflector’ or ‘direct’ mode and may halt the connection 
between the router and the Internet Service Provider (ISP). Most recently ADSL routers are predominately 
becoming victim to ‘reflector’ based attacks. The attacker transmits numerous synchronisation requests to router 
‘A’ with a preset static source IP address of the soon to be compromised, router ‘B’. Router ‘A’ responds to 
these numerous requests and sends the numerous acknowledgement packets to router ‘B’. Eventually two 
routers have had their resources consumed as the SYN and ACK packets are constantly transmitted. 
Alternatively ‘direct’ attacks also consume the router’s resources by flooding it with numerous Transmission 
Control Protocol (TCP), Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), or User Datagram Packets (UDP) sent 
directly from the attacker. In this instance, the source IP address is spoofed each time hence leaving half open 
connections on the targeted router. Due to the resource limitations of the router the device may halt and hence 
require a power-cycle reboot (Chang 2002). 
Access control 
Routers are pre-configured to prevent remote management from an IP address outside of the internal network. 
Research has shown (Stamm et al. 2006) that this security technique can be compromised when an unsuspecting 
individual accesses a webpage and permits a malicious Java Applet to load. Once the malware is loaded onto a 
workstation, it begins to ping the other hosts on the subnet in an attempt to discover the location of the 
gateway/router. After a number of attempts the malware should discover the gateway by detecting which IP 
address is hosting a web configuration management system. Specific images used in the web configuration 
management system are unique to each router and hence the make and model of the router may be detected by 
the type of images retrieved from the default gateway. Once the router type is known, the malware may 
manipulate configuration settings, alters DNS addresses, enables port forwarding and remote management to a 
specific IP address, and disables Network Address Translation (NAT) (Stamm et al. 2006).  
Software robots 
Network address translation (NAT) permits a number of internal workstations to access the Internet 
simultaneously using a router allocated, private IP address. Essentially NAT provides a level of protection to the 
internal hosts by not using a public IP address and is enabled by default on many router brands. However, once 
NAT is purposefully, maliciously or accidentally disabled, the internal hosts may become victim to the control 
of a BotMaster controlling a collection of BotNets. A BotNet is a collection of hosts under the control of a 
BotMaster who controls the infectors and infected hosts to carry out various malicious tasks (Rajab et al. 2006a; 
Rajab et al. 2006b; Ramachandran & Feamster 2006).   
A BotNet is instantiated by a BotMaster whom initiates a transmission of a shell code from an already infected 
host to a newly targeted host. The newly targeted host may become infected through a malware binary download 
(e.g. through an email attachment). The malware begins to download through the trivial file transfer protocol 
(TFTP), which once complete, automatically initiates the configuration scripts, allowing the BotMaster to 
control the victimised workstation. The infected host may then send mass amounts of spam email, install and 
collect data from key loggers, and launch distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. Routers are similar in 
computational power to the computer of the mid 1990’s. Hence, BotMasters are able to abuse the processor 
cycle and memory resources of both a workstation and a router to undertake a range of tasks including, cracking 
complex password or encryption schemes.  
DNS hacking 
The Domain Name Server (DNS) is a dynamic address in most instances is allocated ISP to the router. However, 
the DNS may be easily changed manually by a non-technical individual through the router’s web management 
interface. A compromised ADSL router, configured with a malicious DNS may have all of its traffic forwarded 
to a bogus DNS server (Heron 2007). When the unsuspecting user requests to access their bank, email or 
Microsoft update website they are instead redirected to what looks like the authentic website they would usually 
visit. The illegitimate website may then be used to capture usernames and passwords entered by the end-user 
when attempting authentication. It may also be used to send malicious updates to end-user or redirect them to 
illegal websites. 
Voice over Internet Protocol vulnerabilities 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) uses the existing network infrastructure in-conjunction with ADSL routers 
to conduct voice communication between nodes. VoIP communication can only be permitted by opening 
specific ports to allow the transmission of packets between the external and internal VoIP hosts (Whitworth 
2006). Opening ports on a router increases the number of holes an attacker may use to exploit a system. 
Furthermore, most VoIP devices are computers with scaled down web-servers allowing them to be queried and 
exploited like any web-server if not properly configured (Bradbury 2007).  
If using NAT on a SoHo network this instantiates a problem when attempting to encrypt VoIP communication 
using IPSec (Walsh & Kuhn 2005). The problem lies within the header of the packet, which is encrypted by the 
router on all outbound traffic. This is problematic for the routing device as it is unable to read the destination IP 
addresses of the sender and receiver. Hence, various publications (Tucker 2004; Walberg 2007) propose a 
feasible yet dangerous approach that end-users simply disable NAT and hence use public IP addresses for all of 
the internally networked devices. This approach would permit all internal workstation to be accessible to 
potential offenders over the Internet.  
 
Embedded System Vulnerabilities 
An ADSL router is a scaled down computer system matching the computational power of the desktop 
workstations of the mid 1990's. Collectively an ADSL router is an embedded system compromising of a 
processor, memory and embedded software. A single programming error may cause numerous faults to 
consumers. Acre (2003) discusses that the research department at Core Security Technologies discovered a stack 
and heap buffer overflow error within many embedded systems. More specifically this error targets routers and 
may allow an attacker to bypass all authentication techniques thus acquiring effortless access to the router.  
Tsow (2006) argues that the reason embedded systems and more specifically embedded software are being 
targeted within routers is that virus and malware detectors are unable to scan embedded software. More 
specifically the firmware can be compiled with a static malicious DNS server address. The newly compiled 
malicious firmware may be uploaded to the router prior to sale. Unless a forensic examination is made, scanning 
the router’s operating system for malicious code or processor activity in not available. Numerous router 
firmware images are open-source, permitting an attacker to experiment with the software to discover flaws and 
weaknesses prior to launching an attack (Tsow 2006). Unlike a computer with a new operating system upgrade 
from Windows XP to Windows Vista, a highly skilled hacker changing the firmware on a router without 
authorisation should see no difference to the consumer (Tsow 2006). The router is ideally intended to allow 
trouble free Internet access for the non-technical user. 
ADSL ROUTER FORENSICS FEASIBILITY 
Digital forensics 
Reith et al. (2002) agree that online offenders believe there is still a degree of anonymity when using technology 
to commit electronic crimes. However, computer forensics which once dealt solely with ‘persistent data’ (Nolan 
et al. 2005) now takes on a new stream of evidence acquisition from volatile memory. Forensics investigators 
have identified that volatile evidence may remain on a computer system a long time after the crime was 
committed. Hence, because certain electronic devices do not have persistent storage medium does not mean they 
cannot be forensically investigated. Desktop workstations are no longer the sole means of forensic interest to 
investigators with offenders breaching laws on cell phones, PDAs and importantly network routers. Researchers 
have begun developing methods to collect evidence from devices with volatile memory such as Jansen and 
Ayers (2004) in Guidelines on PDA Forensics and also Jansen and Ayers (2006) in Guidelines on Cell Phone 
Forensics. However, researchers have yet to pursue the development of guidelines, frameworks, models and 
practices on acquiring volatile memory evidence from network routers. 
Computer systems with storage mediums such as hard drives and volatile memory may be forensically analysed 
using pre-tested models, frameworks and techniques. Reith et al. (2002) outline various forensic protocols and 
argue that these practices are not standardised.  Each entity whether it is the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) or US Department of Justice alters these protocols dependant on their needs and requirements. 
Alternatively these entities may also develop new frameworks depending on the device, operating system and 
resources available to the forensic investigator although do not release this to the public realm. The numerous 
digital forensic frameworks and models available (Carrier & Spafford 2003; Department of Justice 2001; 
Ó'Ciardhuáin 2004; Palmer 2001) provide a set of principles and techniques for acquiring, preserving, analysing 
and presenting digital evidence acquired from numerous digital devices. Unfortunately neither of these 
acknowledges ADSL routers as a potential source of evidence. The Department of Justice (2001) does however 
recognise network routers as a potential source of evidence for forensic investigations– specifically the 
configuration files.  
Volatile memory forensics  
Although numerous digital devices have had their volatile memory investigated for potential evidence, viruses 
and malware are yet to be extracted by forensic investigators. Malicious software such as the Code Red and SQL 
Slammer work reside solely in volatile memory (Carrier & Grand 2004). Hence, investigating the hard drive 
may not have recovered evidence of a worm. From a computer forensics perspective, investigating the memory 
contents may recover the current running processes, unencrypted data such as passwords and current user 
activity (Carrier & Grand 2004). One such tool which is capable of forensically examining the contents of 
volatile memory includes WinHex (WinHex 2007). This tools permits investigators  to acquire a memory dump 
which may easily recover unencrypted passwords which have not yet been overwritten in volatile memory 
(Casey 2004). The tool is specifically designed for desktop workstations although it does show that an extraction 
of evidence from volatile memory is feasible.  
A proof of concept device ‘Tribble’ has been developed that allows an investigator to perform a forensic 
analysis on a live workstation (Carrier & Grand 2004). The concept was a Peripheral Component Interconnect 
(PCI) hardware based card which is installed in a desktop workstation prior to its usage. If an attack on the 
target system was undertaken and an analysis was required, Tribble could be used to forensically capture 
evidence from the volatile memory modules (Carrier & Grand 2004). However, this product requires that it be 
installed prior to any attack or investigation being carried out. Furthermore, in the context of ADSL routers such 
a device would require each individual or vendor to attach an additional chipset to their device prior to its sale 
and usage which may not be feasible for the customer or the vendor from an economical sense. 
Typical computer forensic tools may examine a cloned hard disk within an isolated laboratory. However, data of 
a volatile nature cannot be removed from the location of interest as shutting down the device would erase the 
non-persistent data. According to Nelson et al. (2006) network forensics would typically follow the systematic 
process of: 
• Closing the network ports or processes that allowed the intruder to carry out the attack. 
• Acquire the drive which had been compromised. 
• Make an exact replica of the drive with a bit-stream image. 
• Verify the duplicate image to the original image. 
However, using the procedures detailed is not feasible as closing ports, and making a replica would alter the 
volatile data and hence erase potential evidence. For this reason, there is a need for sound volatile memory 
forensic methods which can extract evidence at the scene of the crime within a timely manner, without 
interfering or overwriting existing evidence (Petroni et al. 2006). Thus, the proposed systematic principles are 
not ideal techniques for router forensics as each step may potentially alter or erase the evidence within memory. 
Difficulties of volatile memory modules 
The router’s various memory modules are the key to extracting data of forensic interest (Brown 2006). The only 
persistent component of an ADSL router is the non-volatile Random Access Memory (NVRAM) or flash 
memory and may be forensically examined without altering key evidence to determine if the firmware or 
operating system has been altered. NVRAM on all ADSL routers should contain; power on boot procedures and 
configuration files for the particular network. The Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) or Static 
Random Access Memory (SRAM) contains; current running processes, routing tables, simplified network logs, 
network and connectivity statistics (Brown 2006). Any device which can not be switched off is classified in 
computer forensics as a ‘live’ device. Investigating a ‘live’ device follows the scientific principle that any action 
used to observe the evidence may in essence alter it. Alternatively, shutting down the device may erase the data 
of forensic interest located in the volatile memory modules. Nikkel (2005) suggests the following assumptions 
about router forensics whilst attempting to manifest techniques, methods and tools: 
• The router where the evidence is stored will not be in full custody of the investigator when carrying out 
the investigation. 
• A forensic image of the router’s volatile memory may not be feasible to initiate. 
• The evidence on the router is dynamic and may be erased or altered before the forensic examination 
may take place. 
• Verification of the data collected may prove difficult or impossible if the router is switched off hence 
erasing the volatile memory. 
Hence, when forensically examining volatile memory in a device such as a router Petroni et al. (2006) state that 
in order to decipher the memory status at any point the investigator must thoroughly analyse two main criteria. 
Firstly, identify how the operating system would generally interact with the memory (i.e. what should be in a 
specific memory cell in a normal state) and secondly, how the memory cells would have been rearranged or 
altered during and after an incident occurs (i.e. what the memory cells should contain after the incident 
occurred). 
Industry router forensics 
Although Cisco routers encompass the same volatile memory as SoHo routers they have had some publicity on 
methods to forensically investigate the device after a breach has occurred. Livingston (2005) details what 
evidence (if any) should be extracted from volatile memory initially if an incident occurs. Although she only 
details the commands on a Cisco router using the ‘show’ command, these commands may be replicated on 
common ADSL routers through the Linux telnet or SSH interface. Ideally a connection would be instantiated 
using HyperTerminal or the equivalent to allow logging of the session. The follow points detail a list of items of 
evidence ranked in importance from highest to lowest in conducting a forensic examination (Livingston 2005): 
 • Router system clock information. 
• Firmware type and version. 
• IP address of authenticated users. 
• Configuration files located in NVRAM – boot sequence, default libraries. 
• Routing table information. 
To date there is only one router forensic tool available which is constantly undergoing research and testing. All 
of the evidence above is automatically collected by the evidence collection tool namely the “Cisco Router 
Evidence Extraction Disk” (CREED) created by researcher Thomas Akin (2002). The tool is a small 1.7MB 
program which resides on a bootable floppy disk, requiring minimal interaction from the investigator to 
complete the acquisition procedure. The investigator places the floppy disk into the computer, connects a serial 
cable from the acquisition computer to the router, and once booted the investigator types ‘acquire’ in the console 
and the automated process acquires the evidence (Akin 2002). The tool does however require the serial port on 
the router as part of the connection process which unfortunately is not standard on ADSL routers. Furthermore, 
on many of popular ADSL routers, consumers are only presented with numerous Ethernet ports and a Registered 
Jack (RJ11) telephone line port. 
Investigative procedures  
Conducting an investigation on an ADSL router is feasible and in many instances is able to acquire evidence 
which may be of use to an investigator. Table 1 below details a list of commands which may be issued on a 
Linux workstation. However, since ADSL routers operate under a Linux architecture these commands may also 
be issued on an ADSL router once a telnet or SSH connection is made (Burdach 2004). However, although an 
investigation may be of use to an extent, executing each of the commands may in fact overwrite a potential 
important piece of data in volatile memory.  
 
Table 1 Investigation commands for an ADSL router 
Priority Description Command 
1 Current date and time date -u 
2 Cache tables arp –an route –n 
3 Open TCP/UDP Connections /proc/net/tcp /proc/net/udp 
4 Image of physical memory /proc/kcore 
5 Loaded kernel modules 
/proc/modules 
insmod –f 
/proc/ksmys 
6 Active processes lsof  -n –P –l 
7 
Useful extra information 
• Version 
• Host name 
• Domain name 
• Hardware info 
• Swap partitions 
• Local partitions 
• Mounted file systems 
• Uptime 
 
/proc/version 
/proc/sys/kernel/name 
/proc/sys/kernel/domainame 
/proc/cpuinfo 
/proc/swaps 
/proc/partitions 
/proc/self/mounts 
/proc/uptimes 
 
ACQUIRING EVIDENCE USING JTAG 
The first principle in undertaking a thorough forensic investigation of any digital device is to ensure that the data 
of forensic interest remains unchanged throughout the entire process. As detailed previously the number of 
external ports on an ADSL router is quite limiting in their functionality. A prospective method to acquire 
evidence from an ADSL router is to utilise the Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) boundary-scan. The JTAG port 
is generally utilised by manufacturers for testing circuit boards before they are released to the public for sale 
purposes (Breeuwsma 2006). However, the same principles which are applied to testing circuit boards can also 
be used to forensically acquire data and/or an image from a specific embedded system. The following section 
will briefly outline the potential benefits and methods by which the JTAG boundary-scan may be used. 
Potential benefits 
Many forensic applications load data into the memory which is then executed by the processor. In the instance 
of acquiring evidence from a hard disk on a desktop workstation, a boot disk could be utilised where direct write 
access to the disk is restricted. Only volatile memory and the processor are utilised and data is read from the 
hard disk and is transmitted over a network (using Net Cat) creating a replicated forensic image. Whilst, data 
could be retrieved in ADSL routers utilising a direct Ethernet connection, this would in essence load data into 
memory, potentially leaving a memory footprint which contravenes with the first principle of undertaking a 
forensic investigation. Secondly, had the user set any passwords, attempting to retrieve or bypass these may also 
prove difficult (Breeuwsma 2006) and evidence may be lost before access is granted. Utilising the JTAG port 
permits the investigator to communicate directly with the memory modules acquiring evidence in a sound 
forensic manner. 
In numerous instances ADSL routers halt when a software error is executed or when all available system 
memory is exhausted. Consumers, whom face these dilemmas and contact their Internet Service Provider, are 
instructed to power cycle their router, which clears memory. Furthermore, the power cycle will also cause the 
operating system to reboot and thus resolving any programming error within the software. Unfortunately power 
cycling a router will clear memory and hence remove all potential evidence. The investigator may not be aware 
of how long the router has been operating for and hence a sudden exhaustion of memory by loading a forensic 
tool may again cause the router to come to a halt. Utilising a JTAG port allows the investigator to communicate 
directly with the processor and hence bypassing the need for memory to be allocated to specific forensic tools 
for execution (Breeuwsma 2006). 
Using JTAG for communication 
The JTAG interface is already publicly used amongst the hacker community for imaging firmware onto various 
ADSL routers but more specifically the Linksys WRT54g. By default the Linksys WRT54g does not have a user 
accessible JTAG interface as with many of the publicly available ADSL routers (Figure 1). However, 
resoldering a new 12 pin header onto the board permits the user to connect a pre-purchased or a custom made 
un-buffered JTAG cable as outlined by the developers of the embedded system operating system ‘OpenWRT’ 
(OpenWRT 2007). 
 
 
Figure 1 A Linksys WRT54g with and without a JTAG interface header 
 
The JTAG interface cable may either connect to the serial or parallel port of a workstation. Once a connection to 
the onboard Linksys WRT54g JTAG interface is established, a utility such as the “Hairy Dairy Maid 
Debricking” utility may be utilised. This tool may be run to debug and program the onboard memory modules. 
Whilst, the developer of the firmware recovery utility chooses to remain anonymous for legal purposes, the 
software is not full proof and may damage the router beyond repair. Does utility does permit a user to flash, 
erase or backup the current operating system stored on the Linksys WRT54g router (HairyDairyMaid 2007). 
Whilst the utility does permit an end-user to communicate directly with the processor and hence execute 
commands it does so in a non-forensic manner. Utilising the same principles of direct processor 
communications, research will be undertaken into developing and testing a tool which may essentially trick the 
processor into retrieving the contents from all memory modules and presenting this information in a way which 
is feasible to understand for a forensic investigator. 
 
CONCLUSION: 
The current rate of research on ADSL router forensics is almost non-existent. Research, tools, and 
methodologies on computer hard disk forensics have exhausted itself over the past few years, and it appears that 
the era of cell phone forensics is beginning to gain interest. However, many individuals may be underestimating 
the potential crimes associated with the use of ADSL routers. Until there is a wide interest amongst the forensic 
computing community, the number and severity of these crimes may only escalate. A forensic acquisition 
solution for ADSL routers may also apply to a wide range of consumer electronics in the future. 
The aim of the paper was to increase knowledge on the yet to become mainstream area of ADSL router 
forensics. Whilst routers may already be used to commit electronic crimes as detailed in this paper, as 
technology progresses the rate and publicity of these crimes should also increase. As the cost of manufacturing 
consumer electronics decreases, the next few years should see ADSL routers with increased memory and 
processing power for enhanced firewall rule sets, improved VoIP capability and furthermore permit an increase 
in the number of simultaneous connections.  
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